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In the paper I discuss semantic change as a cognitive adaptation process which ﬂexibly
adjusts the culturally shared conceptual category system of a language to changing
conditions in the environment. I back up this view with the claim that the evolution-
ary function of cognition is to provide the organism with functional “knowledge” of
its environment for the sake of adaptive orientation in a ﬂexible way relative to the
stability of environmental conditions. Hence, the cognitive function of language is to
promote social cognition in order to facilitate the sharing of knowledge that proves
functional and adaptive in the given physical, social and cultural environment of a
group of individuals. In this light the cognitive function of the mental machinery of
conceptualization and imagery—as the basis of meaning as understanding—is the
adaptive construal of phenomena. Semantic leaps in the form of metaphor, metonymy
and other kinds of meaning extension create new adaptive perspectives on the environ-
ment. When the circumstances triggering such novel usage persist, these perspectives
will become conventionalized in the process of semantic change, leading to new estab-
lished forms of functional and adaptive imagery.
1. Introduction
Contrary to approaches to meaning based on the doctrine of philosophical
rationalism, according to which cognition is “the convergence of our ideas
and the truth about the world” (Chomsky 1988, 158), cognitive semantics
claims that meaning is based on mental imagery and conceptualizations
of reality which do not objectively correspond to it but reﬂect a charac-
teristic human way of understanding. Thus, one of the basic axioms of
cognitive semantics is that linguistic meaning originates in the human in-
terpretation of reality. This involves conceptual mappings from familiar
domains of experience to unfamiliar or less well-understood domains in
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the form of metaphor, image schema projections, and blending of mental
spaces, among others (Lakoﬀ–Johnson 1980; Johnson 1987; Fauconnier
1994; 1997).
Since meaning derives from the way human beings make sense of
the world, the conceptualizations which underlie meaning are not gov-
erned by autonomous linguistic processes but their operation is based
on cognitive mechanisms at any level of cognitive functioning— from
perception to complex conceptual structures (Langacker 1987, 98; 1991,
2). Although this involves a great deal of subjectivity due to the fact
that cognitive processes occur in individual human minds, meaning is
“shared, public, and ‘objective,’ in an appropriate sense of objectivity”
due to common human ways of embodied understanding of a shared re-
ality (Johnson 1987, 175), and also a common conceptualizing capacity
(Lakoﬀ 1987, 280).
However, an account of the social nature of linguistic meaning re-
quires an even more functional and practical explanation in terms of so-
cial interaction because of the dynamic nature of language. The system of
a language is never in a motionless state. Changes are continuously going
on in all of its parts, meaning being the most unstable area in this re-
spect. Changes in the meanings of otherwise established expressions tend
to occur relatively easily, often within the lifetime of one generation (cf.
McMahon 1994, 174–5). This is made possible by the fact that meaning
relies on rather malleable conceptual structures (in the minds of individu-
als). Categories are relatively easily stretched or reshaped owing to their
prototypical nature and fuzzy boundaries, and the encyclopedic nature of
meaning even allows the prototypical center to shift and thereby give rise
to a new category (Győri 2002, 152). The cognitive operations underlying
these linguistic processes can obviously occur only in the minds of individ-
ual speakers and reﬂect their individual perspectives and understanding
of the world. However, such individual conceptualizations are constrained
not only by the common conceptualizing capacity and the shared real-
ity but also by the requirement of intelligibility between interlocutors.
Mutual intelligibility demands some common ground which is achieved
through the interlocutors coordinating their expectations of each other’s
intentions on the basis of all those various commonalities that consti-
tute their culture (Clark 1996, 325). Thus, the social nature of meaning
actually evolves through the conventionalization of individual conceptual-
izations during speaker-hearer interaction in the communicative process.
In other words, the conceptualizations constituting the semantic poles of
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expressions will be continuously “shaped for symbolic purposes according
to the dictates of linguistic convention” (Langacker 1987, 98).
Thus, making sense of the world actually happens at two levels. On
the one hand, the malleability of conceptual structures allows their re-
shaping by way of various cognitive mechanisms, which is good strategy
for making sense of the world at the level of the individual. However,
when individual conceptualizations are put into linguistic form for com-
municative purposes, the interlocutors partake in a social cognitive ac-
tivity. They share the contents of their minds: mental representations,
mental states, beliefs, etc. With the speciﬁc conceptualizations becom-
ing conventionalized as meanings of particular linguistic expressions, a
collective or social level of sense making is achieved.
Below I will look at these levels of sense making from a wider perspec-
tive. Speciﬁcally I will consider how they relate to the cognitive function
of language in general, the relationship between cognition and language,
and the evolutionary function of cognition. My aim is to provide a func-
tional explanation of meaning as understanding at both the individual
and social levels and of the interactive processes between them.
2. Meaning as creative and conventionalized understanding
The lexicon of every language codes a relatively well-deﬁned and ﬁ-
nite system of conceptual categories, i.e., established conceptualizations,
which are available to speakers for communicating their mental contents
and their perspectives of the world in conventionalized ways. In spite of
this, speakers often take a particular expression (or word) and employ
it in an unconventional or ﬁgurative way in some novel context. This
section will look at how meaning as understanding reveals itself in this
dynamic character of the semantic structure of language. I will discuss
how and why speakers diverge from conventional ways of expression and
how and why such divergence aﬀects the category system of language in
the long run.
2.1. Making sense through semantic leaps
There are various sociocultural and psychological factors due to which
speakers may occasionally judge the entrenched meanings provided by
the conventional expressions of their language unsuitable or insuﬃcient
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for conveying their ideas. When none of the available expressions seem
to match their momentary conceptualization of some aspect of reality,
speakers may resort to some novel ﬁgurative usage which deviates from
conventional modes of expression. In this way they temporarily mod-
ify the conventional meaning of a particular expression with the purpose
of getting some novel conceptualization across. Speakers resort to such
context dependent temporary semantic modiﬁcations of conventional ex-
pressions in order to comply with some immediate communicative expec-
tation (Tomasello 2002 [1999], 168).
Geeraerts (1997) has claimed that novel usage is governed primarily
by two basic communicative principles: expressivity and eﬃciency, where
“expressivity is always the primary cause of change, whereas eﬃciency in-
volves the choice of the linguistic means realizing the expressive intention”
(Geeraerts op.cit., 105). The semantic extension which occurs during the
creative-innovative usage of an otherwise established expression is possi-
ble due to the malleability of the underlying conceptual structures. Based
on these, speakers employ various cognitive mechanisms in the form of
metaphor, metonymy, narrowing or broadening of meaning, blending, etc.
for the sake of immediate expressiveness in their communicative interac-
tions. Thus, a speaker trying to comply with communicative needs also
faces a cognitive challenge. Phenomena of reality are designated not only
for the sake of discourse, but also because conceptualizations ﬁxed in
this way are essential for economical and eﬀective thought. As Anderson
(1988, 93) pointed out, language stabilizes conceptual structure against
fragmentation.
Some two decades ago Carroll (1985) conducted a study which oﬀers
some indication as to how novel expressions might do the job. In Carroll’s
study subjects were asked to make up names for various things, either
unfamiliar or only lacking a conventional name. It was observed that the
names generated tended to describe and categorize because they referred
in some degree to properties of the name’s referent. When the subjects
were asked to rate the names they produced according to quality, the
names that were easy to learn and remember (i.e., descriptive, natural,
etc.) and easy to use (i.e., distinctive, brief, etc.) were rated as “good
names” (Carroll op.cit., 5). As the criteria for easy remembering and
easy usage indicate, names are the better the more unambiguously they
highlight a category. This is obviously due to what Rosch (1978, 30)
called the cue validity of features, which is the degree to which a particular
feature of a category has the capacity to cue the complete category, i.e.,
the total set of its features.
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Therefore, when initiating innovative usage in an eﬀort to commu-
nicate some unconventional conceptualization, a speaker must search for
an expression with a semantic structure that is appropriate to be modi-
ﬁed in the desired way, and must also make a choice as to the cognitive
mechanism to implement the modiﬁcation in the most eﬀective manner.
This procedure is aﬀected by the salience of features of phenomena to
be conceptualized, which is functionally determined by speciﬁc cogni-
tive factors (Győri 2002). Basically, this functionally determined salience
inﬂuences the possible construals of phenomena and through this the
choice of an expression to be used in a non-conventional way. For exam-
ple, Common Germanic *huson meaning ‘covering for the legs’ developed
through metonymical extension from Proto-Indo-European *(s)keu- ‘to
cover’ obviously due to the conceptualization of the garment as ‘a thing
covering (the legs)’ on the basis of the most salient feature. As later de-
velopment in English testiﬁes, the expression with the sense ‘leg covering’
(cf. German Hose ‘pants’) gave rise through metaphorical extension to
the word hose with a completely independent meaning, i.e., a hose was
conceptualized as ‘a thing similar to the leg of a pair of trousers.’
Thus, in the process of semantic change new categories are created
(cf. Győri 1996), since language is obviously a device for the categoriza-
tion of experience (e.g., Geeraerts 1997, 7–8, 20; Taylor 1989). Content
words clearly name categories but the fact that language is a system
of categories is apparent not only in the case of content words. Func-
tional elements (e.g., articles, prepositions, suﬃxes, etc.) also categorize
reality, as they are very general categorizations of relations between non-
linguistic phenomena as humans perceive them. Many prepositions, for
instance, are linguistic instantiations of various image schemata, i.e., they
categorize recurring patterns in our experience, like in and out in the case
of the container schema, up and down in the case of the verticality
schema, or from and to in the case of the source–path–goal schema
(Johnson 1987, 30ﬀ.; Lakoﬀ 1987, 271ﬀ.).
Speakers’ linguistic behavior is inﬂuenced by various communicative
maxims pertaining to successful communication in the widest sense, from
getting one’s ideas across eﬃciently to achieving social success (Keller
1994). In order to comply with such maxims, speakers often construct
meaning in creative ways and produce semantic leaps in the form of
occasional wordings with a ﬁgurative meaning (Coulson 2001). If writ-
ten, these would often require quotation marks to indicate their unusual-
ness and to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the conventional
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meaning has been altered. Most of the time, however, the modiﬁcation of
conventional linguistic forms happens spontaneously and unconsciously
in the course of communicative interaction between speakers and hearers
(Anttila 1989, 408). Therefore, spontaneous and intuitive mutual intel-
ligibility between the interlocutors is a basic requirement in the case of
newly introduced expressions with no established conventional meanings
in the language (Palmer 1978, 309; Fritz 1998, 21).
Thus, the communicative principles and the cognitive factors do not
just guide creative mental processing in the production of novel meaning
through semantic leaps, but they must also facilitate intelligibility, i.e.,
the comprehension side of meaning construction (Coulson 2001, 2). Mu-
tual intelligibility derives from various sources, from the common human
ways of embodied understanding of a shared reality and a common con-
ceptualizing capacity, involving various universal cognitive mechanisms
and operations, to the perceptual and functional salience of phenomena
and the context-dependence of unconventional expressions, all of which is
based on the shared knowledge of the interlocutors. All of these together
will provide the basis for the proper interpretation of occasion-bound
meanings.
However, one of the best possible grounds for mutual intelligibility
is the analogical character of human mental processing. It is a basic
characteristic of human thought that all new phenomena are mentally
grasped via an analogy to already familiar cognitive structures (e.g., Heit
1997; Gentner–Markman 1997; Holyoak–Thagard 1997). Anttila (1989,
141) has even claimed that language is part of the human innate capac-
ity for analogy. In fact, we utilize familiar knowledge through analogical
thinking when we categorize, make inferences and create and learn new
abstractions. Analogy is crucial in making sense of the world by recogniz-
ing similarities, i.e., by noticing that certain new experiences are similar
to old ones in speciﬁc ways. However, similarity is not just ‘out there’
but is to a large extent in the eye of the beholder. According to Holyoak
(1984, 204), “[a]nalogy [. . .] is structured similarity with functional im-
port.” Holyoak and Thagard (1997, 36) have identiﬁed three constraints
in analogical reasoning. First, the analogy rests on perception of direct
similarity. Second, structural parallels are sought for. And third, the
analogy has a certain purpose, i.e., it is guided by what the reasoner
intends to achieve by it.
This functionality is crucial to the mechanism of innovative usage
and the construction of novel meaning. The choice of a conventional
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expression from which the speaker ‘takes a semantic leap’ in order to
get some new conceptualization across depends on what familiar cogni-
tive structure that expression designates and the way this structure can
be utilized by processing it through various cognitive mechanisms like
metaphor, metonymy, blending, etc. This ensures both the adaptability
of meaning to new experience and the intelligibility of meaning exten-
sion. Furthermore, as Geeraerts (1997, 113–4) has shown, the ﬂexibility
and dynamism of the prototypical character of semantic structure also
restricts the range and direction of such extensions, which serves as an
additional aid for interpretation.
The basis of cognitive semantics is akin to the above insights in
cognitive psychology, as Langacker’s (1987, 105) formulation testiﬁes:
“Our mental experience is coherent by virtue of the structure we impose on
it. A pivotal aspect of this structuring capacity is the interpretation of novel
experience with reference to previous experience, [. . .].”
Johnson (1987, 174) has also stressed the importance of familiar infor-
mation in making sense of new experience, and Lakoﬀ (1987, 346) has
pointed out that motivation—in the sense of relatively easy cognitive
processing due to certain clues providing mental support, like iconicity
(cf. Anttila 1989, 152)— is crucial to our understanding, learning and
storing of new information. It is also this analogical character of human
thinking that gains expression in ﬁgurative language. Our minds under-
stand and interpret the world around us with the help of metaphorical and
metonymical processes, image schematic projections, and idealized cogni-
tive models (Lakoﬀ–Johnson 1980; Lakoﬀ 1987; Johnson 1987; Kövecses
–Radden 1998; Gibbs–Colston 1995).
The fundamental cognitive processes, mostly metaphor and meto-
nymy, that are universally employed by humans to comprehend the vari-
ous phenomena of reality, i.e., “to make sense of the world,” are manifest
not only in the innovative though context-dependent spontaneous usage
of established expressions, but actually they are also the ones that his-
torical semantics has established as the basic linguistic mechanisms of
historical change of meaning and according to which the larger portion
of individual semantic changes can be classiﬁed. The well-deﬁnedness and
ﬁniteness of linguistically coded cultural categories, mentioned at the be-
ginning of this section, is thus only theoretically true, since the category
system coded in the lexicon of a language can never be captured in a com-
pletely motionless state. New expressions (words) continuously emerge in
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the lexicon and existing expressions tend to acquire new meanings giving
rise through this to new conceptual categories.
The conceptualizations reﬂected in innovative usage will ﬁrst become
temporarily coded in the language in the form of non-conventional expres-
sions. Although most of them fade away quickly, some will spread and
ﬁnd their way into the system of the language. Coding in language evi-
dently facilitates the activation of the appropriate cognitive routines and
thus contributes to a category reaching a degree of entrenchment through
which it achieves unit status (Langacker 1987, 100). Thus, Anderson’s
(1988, 93) claim, made from the perspective of cognitive psychology, that
language stabilizes concept structure against fragmentation appears to be
valid in this special historical sense, too, because it is obviously a lexical
item through which a conceptual category can exist most explicitly at
the social-cultural level.
Thus, we can look at the results of semantic changes in the lexicon as
“fossilized” conceptualizations of previous generations. These conceptu-
alizations have outlived the period of their spontaneous appearance and
have become culturally established. In this way they later on impose par-
ticular conceptualizations of the world on future generations, but at the
same time also provide the source for creative novel usage in the future.
Since it is a historical linguistic fact that “words come from other words”
(Hopper 1990, 151), the inventory of established expressions will con-
strain possible novel conceptualizations in the communicative-cognitive
activity of interlocutors. Thus, linguistically coded categories will canal-
ize the utilization of familiar knowledge in innovative usage because the
larger portion of culturally shared knowledge is obviously manifest in the
semantic structure of the available conventional expressions.
In sum, semantic change is the result of two diﬀerent processes at
two interconnected levels. The ﬁrst level is that of innovative usage in
everyday linguistic activity. The second level consists in the spreading
and conventionalization of innovations. The two levels are organically
interconnected not only because the output of the ﬁrst level serves as
input for the second level, but also because in turn the output of the sec-
ond level furnishes the material on which the processes of the ﬁrst level
operate. That is, the source for new semantic extensions (or leaps) is pro-
vided by one-time innovations that have become established expressions.
In the following I will examine the signiﬁcance of the interdependence of
this interconnection with regard to the cognitive functioning of language.
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2.2. Semantic extension and semantic change: on-line and long-term
cognitive adaptation
Whenever we use language, we attempt to use it in a way that it repre-
sents our conceptualizations of the world as faithfully as possible for the
purpose of communicating them to others. As already mentioned, there
are several pressures on eﬀective communication. These include immedi-
ate representing and referring needs, communicative expectations, adher-
ence to communicative maxims, striving for expressivity and eﬃciency in
communicative interaction, clarity and precision of expression, and the
faithful rendering of one’s own perspective, among others. Beside these
internal factors external ones like variations and transitions of our every-
day environment may also pose cognitive-communicative challenges for
the interlocutors, who are thus often induced to resort to linguistic inno-
vations, usually in the form of meaning extensions, novel compounds and
derivations, or by initiating metaphorical, metonymical and other indi-
rect references. These linguistic operations are the direct manifestation
of the cognitive-communicative function of language and are the result of
ﬂexible adaptive linguistic behavior in the eﬀort to eﬀectively cope with
the communicative and cognitive challenges.
As Palmer (1996) eloquently argues, the human capacity for imagery
“is adaptive if it guides or promotes adaptive behaviors,” and language
must have evolved to provide “a means by which speakers can evoke and
reinforce adaptive imagery in one another” (Palmer op.cit., 52). The
ad hoc innovative usages in the everyday linguistic activity of speakers
serve this evoking and reinforcing of adaptive imagery and they function
as the mechanism of continuous or “on-line” adjustment of language to
novel conditions. Depending on the persistence of such conditions, speak-
ers may tailor their language repeatedly to the same circumstances in the
same way. Obviously, the conceptualizations and semantic leaps—mani-
fest in these innovative unconventional expressions—that best serve this
adaptive purpose are the ones that are most likely to get conventional-
ized and ﬁxed in the semantic structure of the language through semantic
change in the long run. In this way the semantic structure of the lan-
guage becomes adapted to the cognitive-communicative conditions which
have originally triggered the innovative usages but have become stable
and culturally salient.
For any change to qualify as true adaptation in an evolutionary sense,
it must come about by way of a selection mechanism (Plotkin 1994, 51).
In fact, several authors have proposed that the spreading of linguistic
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innovations is actually a selection process. Thus, the conventionalization
of novel expressions is a sociocultural process that is based on selection
from a pool of linguistic variation (cf. Fritz 1998, 73; Keller 1985, 234;
McMahon 1994, 225). According to Croft’s Theory of Utterance Selec-
tion, variation comes about through altered replication of linguistic forms
as “a result of speakers adjusting the mapping from language structure to
external function [. . .], that is, meaning in context” (Croft 2000, 8). When
speakers select such non-conventional variants, they gradually establish
a convention through the use of these variants in appropriate contexts
(Croft op.cit., 7 and 30). However, most authors claim that, contrary to
biological evolutionary changes, linguistic changes appear to be teleolog-
ical processes because in language change it is not a spontaneously given
variability upon which selection acts in order to adapt the system to the
challenges of changed conditions. This non-predetermined but seemingly
still goal-directed character of language change is described by Keller
(1985, 235) in the following way (cf. also Croft op.cit., 31):
“[. . .] whereas, in nature, the variations evolve according to chance, with
regard to communicating we create variation already in anticipation of the
selection to be expected.”
Though language does not change in a predetermined direction, on the
above grounds it seems to be undeniable that language is inherently a
goal-directed system (Anttila 1989, 194). This appears to be especially
obvious in semantic change where the ultimate source of variation is the
speakers’ creative and innovative usage of their language. Particular vari-
ants are created in response to communicative and cognitive challenges,
i.e., the emergence of the variability of linguistic expressions is condi-
tioned by changing circumstances because they arise as the result of an
immediate problem-solving behavior ﬁrst. This communicative behavior
is triggered by various “phenomena of culture [. . .] [which] elicit various
responses to nomination, for example, metaphor, metonymy, or other
ﬁgures of speech, and, as a result, synchronic variation increases. This
variation is the basis of semantic change [. . .]” (Anttila op.cit., 153).
Thus, semantic change is inherently functional. The innovations that
prove to be adaptive conceptualizations of given phenomena will be se-
lected from the variation of the available innovations through an (uncon-
scious) preference by the speech community, which preference is actually
the manifestation of an adaptive linguistic behavior. In other words,
when a particular innovative usage comes under a lasting selection pres-
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sure in the form of communicative needs of a wide sociocultural range,
change will occur in the language system.
3. The nature of cognition: an evolutionary explanation of
adaptive processes in language
Above I argued that semantic change is basically a cognitive adaptation
process in language. However, this claim is somewhat vague unless it can
be embedded in an evolutionary theory of cognition and is supported by
what is known about the adaptive function of cognition in general. There-
fore, my aim in this section is to supplement and strengthen my point by
presenting an evolutionary biological view of cognition and showing how
the cognitive functioning of language, including the processes of cognitive
adaptation, derives from the general biological functions of cognition.
3.1. The functions of cognition
According to an old deﬁnition by Neisser (1976, 1), “[c]ognition is the
activity of knowing: the acquisition, organization and use of knowledge.”
This deﬁnition—as Neisser also indicated—does not apply to human
beings alone but also to non-human animals. The activity of knowing
is primarily of a biological nature and is an evolutionary adaptation be-
cause the acquisition, organization and application of knowledge about
the environment is in general the fundamental basis of any organism’s
contact and interaction with the environment it inhabits (Plotkin 1994).
Cognition has an adaptive role because all this functioning has one
aim: to enhance the organism’s average probability of survival in its
environment by adjusting its behavior to expected situations (Csányi
1989, 205; Plotkin op.cit., 120). Consequently, not all information that
can be picked up from the environment will count as relevant for an
organism in its interactive behavior with the environment. Only the in-
formation the processing of which contributes to the organism’s adaptive
behavior will be utilized. In other words, the function of cognition is
knowing the world in a way that is required for an organism’s adap-
tive interaction with its environment. The cognitive mechanisms of any
organism have been adapted to this interaction and permit therefore a
species-speciﬁc perception of the environment and processing of incom-
ing information. Hence, cognition appears to be of a relativistic nature.
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On the one hand, the same environment will require diﬀerent functional
interactions, thus diﬀerent “views” of it, in diﬀerent species. On the
other hand, the same environment may require diﬀerent interactions on
diﬀerent occasions of the same individual, depending on a multitude of
various internal and external factors. Rosch (1978, 29) formulates this
idea very clearly:
“[T]he perceived world [. . .] [is] not a metaphysical world without a knower.
What kinds of attributes can be perceived are [. . .] species-speciﬁc. [. . .]
What attributes will be perceived [. . .] is undoubtedly determined by many
factors having to do with the functional needs of the knower interacting with
the physical and social environment.”
The biological mechanisms for acquiring, organizing and applying knowl-
edge operate primarily within an individual organism. Thus, the function
of cognition is to construct and operate a dynamic internal model of the
environment which controls the organism’s behavior for the sake of adap-
tive interaction with that environment (cf. Csányi 1992). The proportion
of genetically determined knowledge of the environment and of the nec-
essary behavior therein on the one hand and individual experience and
learned behavior on the other within that model is a function of both the
complexity of the organism and of its environment (Bonner 1980, 138;
Csányi 1988; Plotkin 1994, 149). The notion of environment, though, in-
cludes not only the natural and material environment but, relative to the
complexity of the behavioral organization of a species, also their social
and cultural environment. Therefore, in proportion to the complexity of
social relationships in the lifestyle of a species, individually acquired and
organized knowledge must be made collective within a group of individu-
als, i.e., cognition must take on social dimensions. Quiatt and Reynolds
(1993, 141) deﬁne social cognition as “[t]he application of intelligence to
the review of social information and the exploitation and management
of social relationships toward attainment of short- and long-term goals.”
Thus, diﬀerent species participate in social cognition to the extent that
they rely on social interaction for their survival. This must be matched
by the complexity of the diﬀerent forms and mechanisms of communica-
tion through which the necessary sharing of information is achieved for
the operation of a collective model.
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3.2. Language as a tool for individual and social cognition
Human cognition derives from and shows evolutionary continuity with
cognitive functioning in non-human primates in general (cf. Tomasello
2002, 32). Due to the extraordinary complexity of the human environ-
ment, however, which includes socially and culturally determined com-
ponents to an exceptionally large extent, the adaptive function of hu-
man cognition pertains to functional behavior and appropriate orienta-
tion mostly in the human sociocultural environment rather than just to
survival in the strict biological sense. To match this behavioral com-
plexity, humans possess the most powerful device for sharing knowledge.
Thus, human cognition is unique with regard to the fact that it is supple-
mented by a special device, language. Language is the evolutionary inno-
vation of combining the interindividual function of communication and
the individual function of cognition in one system, creating the capacity
to manipulate symbols, which are used both externally in communica-
tion and internally in mental representation simultaneously (Győri 1999;
2001; Tomasello 2003). As a result, language is a tool not only for indi-
vidual cognition, but due to its symbolic nature it enormously enhances
the possibilities for social cognition (cf. Palmer 1996, 53).
An eﬀective communicative system of a symbolic kind will enhance
the power of a mental model of reality by lending it a social charac-
ter. As a consequence, human mental models do not remain conﬁned
to knowledge gained from direct and personal experience, and individu-
als will be able to partake of and beneﬁt from the experience of others
in extreme proportions (cf. Plotkin 1994, 10). By facilitating the repre-
sentation and distribution of individually acquired knowledge, language
creates a culturally shared mental model of reality for the advantage of
the whole community. Such a model of reality is more powerful and less
subjective than any individual model because the adequacy of the model
is constantly controlled by being compared to other individual models.
In other words, the conceptual structures constituting the model are con-
tinuously coordinated and harmonized in the communicative interactions
of interlocutors. In this way individuals sharing a language will also be
able to share the same model of reality, which is qualitatively superior to
any individual (i.e., private) model in range, accuracy, ﬂexibility, etc.
Thus, the basic cognitive function of language builds on the general
biological function of cognition in individual organisms but diﬀers from
it with regard to the fact that it serves as the basis for a culturally
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shared model of reality on which every individual in a community can
rely for the construction and operation of their own mental models of
the environment in coordination with those of others. The power of
this model derives from the fact that the basis of the knowledge shared
through it is neither some common genetic endowment nor necessarily
the same experience, but its symbolic nature. This symbolic model—
with the help of the components (grammatical rules and linguistic signs)
constituting it—can be operated creatively in various ways for processing
information about the environment. New cognitive structures can be
constructed actively and subjectively by any one individual and then
conveyed to other individuals in order to substitute direct experience
for them or to provide them with abstract conceptual constructions for
understanding various relations between phenomena of reality.
In order for this social cognitive process to function correctly, lan-
guage—as a social instrument for cognizing the environment—must al-
ways suit the cognitive needs of a speech community. This means that
it must be able to encode all the necessary information about reality
and model it in a way that facilitates optimal accommodation to a given
environment. In other words, any particular language has to be such
that it adaptively serves the acquisition, organization and application of
knowledge in a community for interaction with the speakers’ environment,
exactly the things that make up the function of cognition in general (cf.
Neisser 1976, 1).
4. Adapting language to cognition
In section 2 I described how semantic change occurs in language and
claimed that it is an adaptation process. Here, armed with the wisdom
of the previous section about the evolutionary function of cognition, I will
discuss the broader relevance of semantic change for human cognition.
4.1. The adaptedness of language
Human cognition is characterized by its strong reliance on symbolic struc-
tures in the form of language. Therefore, language must inherently be
designed to serve cognition. Even though the symbolic power of language
is employed for creating a sociocultural cognitive model and not for the
sake of individual cognitive processes, the cognitive function of language
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is in line with the general biological function of cognition—though in
a much more complex manner. As described above, the general biolog-
ical function of cognition is knowing one’s “world” for the purpose of
interacting with it in optimally functional ways. This cognitive function-
ing does not simply depend on objective characteristics of reality but on
the ways a given organism adapts to its environment due to its biology.
Therefore, language—as an instrument of adaptive cognitive function-
ing—is obviously not structured as inﬂuenced by reality itself in some
objective fashion. Language provides us with a special human perspec-
tive of reality (Tomasello 2002 [1999]; Lakoﬀ 1987), manifest in “[t]he
perspectival nature of linguistic meaning [, which] implies that the world
is not objectively reﬂected in language” (Geeraerts 1997, 8). The speciﬁc
cognitive perspective language provides of reality facilitates our adaptive
interpretation of our environment.
Thus, a particular language—as a cognitive model of cultural va-
lidity in a human community—will function as an eﬃcient cognitive
device only if it provides an interpretation of the world that proves to be
adaptive in the given natural and sociocultural environment of its speak-
ers. In other words, for an adequate cognitive functioning any particular
language must be adapted to the speciﬁc physical, social, cultural, histor-
ical, etc. environment which it is to model and in which it is to be used.
Therefore, the system of conceptual categories deﬁned in the lexicon of a
language and manifest in a common repertoire of conventionalized con-
ceptualizations in the minds of individual speakers provides ready-made
functional knowledge about reality. These conceptual categories, stored
in a linguistic form, furnish the “building blocks” of a speech community’s
social model of the environment, which constitutes an essential part of the
culture of the community and also serves the cultural inheritance of ex-
perience and knowledge across generations (cf. Tomasello op.cit., 180–1).
If the socially shared category system is to be an adaptive inter-
pretation of reality, there must be good reasons why meanings of a lan-
guage specify the categories they do and not others (cf. Clark 1996, 340).
Comparing the semantic structures of languages, it becomes immediately
apparent that diﬀerent languages impose diﬀerent categorizations on the
world. This obviously results from the way languages are adapted to their
environments—in line with the general function of cognition and the cog-
nitive function of language (cf. Tomasello op.cit., 127). An adequate ori-
entation in a given sociocultural environment requires a speciﬁc category
system and appropriate construals of particular phenomena. Thus, for
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instance, languages of diﬀerent peoples and cultures often construe the
same phenomena of reality in diﬀerent ways because their diﬀerent envi-
ronments demand diﬀerent ways of adapting to them. Because of this,
linguistic categorization very often reﬂects a rather intricate and complex
social and cultural environment. This can be seen among others in the
case of various classiﬁers in many aboriginal languages (e.g., Lakoﬀ 1987,
chapter 6; Palmer 1996, 126–41; Palmer–Woodman 2000). For instance,
from the ten noun classes found in the Australian aboriginal language
Nangikúrungurr and marked with separate preﬁxes, one contains only
names of weapons, and another exclusively names of spears (Wierzbicka
1984, 314). This should be due to the fact that weapons (and among
them spears especially) play a special role in the lifestyle of this people.
4.2. Semantic change as adaptation process
The ready-made knowledge about the environment the speakers of a lan-
guage live in is functional and adaptive only relative to the stability of
conditions over time (Palmer 1996, 52). Most of the time a language
is relatively well adapted to this environment and facilitates the proper
exchange of beliefs, ideas, knowledge, etc. about it by providing appro-
priate perspectives on reality in the form of diﬀerent categorizations.
However, the environment is never a stable metaphysical reality, but a
changing one, and particularly our interpretation of it does not remain
stable through time. Therefore, when cognizing reality, our conceptual
system continuously exhibits an interplay between stability and ﬂexibility
in order to ﬁt stable conditions, but at the same time also to be able to
adapt to novel ones (Medin–Barsalou 1987, 468). This cognitive function-
ing must also have its eﬀect on language. More precisely, the environment
will exert its eﬀect on language ﬁltered through cognition, and cognition
will shape linguistic structure to its needs (though naturally within the
boundaries of the general structural properties of natural language).
It follows from the cognitive function of language that it should not
only provide a means to adaptively model, both socially and individually,
the given environment, but that it must also function as a ﬂexible device
for cognition to accommodate to any enduring change of cultural rele-
vance in the environment and—given the human cultural and intellectual
complexity—also in the perspectives and attitudes the community collec-
tively takes on it. Thus, in order to remain a functional communicative
and cognitive system, it is crucial that language be continuously suited to
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cognition in a proper way. As Anttila (1989, 179) says, “[l]anguage serves
the sociocultural ends and its task is thus to keep itself in an enduring
state, to keep functioning, adapting itself to new environments.”
Therefore, language must incorporate a mechanism which can opti-
mally handle its adaptation to new circumstances. As far as the cate-
gorization function of language is concerned, the continuous adaptation
of language to the changing conditions of and social attitudes to the
particular environment in which it is used happens—as already indi-
cated—through semantic-lexical change (Győri 2002). Thus, it may be
argued that the diﬀerences in the semantic structure of diﬀerent lan-
guages are due to the formation of culturally adaptive categories, which
happens in the process of lexicalization, i.e., through semantic and lexical
changes (accompanied by the morphological mechanisms of compounding
and derivation) in the course of the history of a language. Etymologies re-
veal a great deal about how reality can be construed in alternate ways to
facilitate this adaptation. For instance, the nouns skin and hide are syn-
onymous expressions but their etymologies suggest totally diﬀerent con-
ceptualizations. Skin derives from Proto-Indo-European *sek- ‘cut’ via
the extended root *skend- ‘to peel oﬀ’ (though via Scandinavian trans-
mission), while hide derives from Proto-Indo-European *(s)keu- ‘cover,
conceal.’ Thus, skin was conceptualized as ‘something that can be cut
or peeled oﬀ the body of an animal,’ while hide was conceptualized as
‘something covering the body’. Consider further the English words crab,
lobster and shrimp, the etymologies of which suggest conceptualizations
as ‘the carving one’, ‘spider-like’, and ‘curved’, respectively. These words
have no conventional everyday cover term in English, only the Latin crus-
tacean, which, however, also covers wood lice, water ﬂeas and barnacles.
Hungarian rák, on the contrary, is a conventional everyday expression in
the language and is not considered a genuine cover term even though it
covers the former three from the above categories as one kind, but not
the latter three, as it is not a biological technical term as crustacean is.
As we have seen in section 2, the historical linguistic mechanism
of semantic change does not simply lag behind independently occurring
conceptual changes as some kind of labeling process but relies on and
reﬂects the conceptualizations emerging from the conceptual mappings
and the process of meaning construction in innovative language use. In
other words, our cognitive processes will necessarily tailor language to the
needs of cognition: the way we see the world and think about it in non-
symbolic ways clearly aﬀects the form of language (cf. Clark 1996, 342).
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As Rosch (1978, 27) has claimed, the speciﬁc categories of the human
mind that get coded in any particular language are not the “arbitrary
product of historical accident or of whimsy” but the product of functional
principles of categorization, and working with those categories should be
the most eﬃcient way to deal with the environment. Consequently, the
two basic psychological principles, “cognitive economy” and “perceived
world structure” (Rosch op.cit., 28–9), also inﬂuence what conceptual
categories will be socially adaptive and will as a result achieve cultural
signiﬁcance to become coded in a language. Thus, the process of cultural
category formation is functional in nature since it is based on a speech
community’s social cognitive adaptation to situations its members are
likely to encounter in their environment and which they have to handle
by thinking, reasoning and communicating about them.
The social validity of these structures is achieved in the process of
“conventionalization” through “sanctioning” by a speech community in
speaker-hearer interaction (Langacker 1987, 65–6 and 156). This is of
course not to deny that due to the complexity of design, language will
necessarily also possess ultimately arbitrary structural features, i.e., ones
without any functional relevance, and which are derived eﬀects of other
structures or eﬀects of general structural constraints. Such phenomena
will inevitably also leave their mark on the way language is.
5. Conclusion
Emergent meaning originating in creative meaning extensions (often cou-
pled with compounding and derivation) can most of the time not be ac-
counted for in purely algorithmic terms. Our capacity for the ﬂexible
use of meanings—manifest in non-rule-governed meaning creations—
serves the purpose of adjusting our perspectives on our world in commu-
nicatively and cognitively functional ways, especially in accordance with
ﬂuctuations and variations of our environment. The human capacity for
construal, conceptualization and imagery is adaptive in several ways. It
enables the ﬂexible communication of various cognitive perspectives we
may take on the environment as inﬂuenced by the various ways we in-
teract with its diverse phenomena, or by the role they play in our social,
cultural or natural lives, but it also enables the communication of individ-
ual idiosyncratic perspectives versus established ones that we collectively
take on things when unexpected circumstances so require.
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Though the above cognitive functioning is part of our linguistic ca-
pacity, it is rooted in the general evolutionary function of cognition, which
we share with other species. This function is to provide an organism with
functional knowledge about its environment in the form of an internal
model that is operated by the organism in order to adjust its behav-
ior in a way that enhances its chances of survival. The adaptiveness of
knowledge in these terms does not imply cognizing the environment in an
objective fashion but refers to the fact that an organism has the capacity
to “understand” the world—through operating its internal model of it—
in exactly the way that promotes its survival, orientation and general
success in concord with its biological make-up and needs, its individual
experience with idiosyncratic factors of its environment, and also any
unforeseen challenges posed by transitions of the environment.
Cognition is thus primarily an adaptive biological function in in-
dividual organisms. Its coupling with the function of communication
makes cognition socially adaptive because information about the envi-
ronment and the knowledge of appropriate interaction with it can be
shared among individuals. Such interaction can then be harmonized and
organized to the beneﬁt of a whole group. Human language promotes
social cognition to an exceptionally high extent due to its symbolic na-
ture, i.e., the sophisticated combination of cognition and communication
in one system. Symbols can not only be used to activate similar (or the
same) mental representations in others, but also to create such. They
can substitute personal experience and enable the sharing of knowledge
even across generations.
The symbols of language provide us economically with ready-made
knowledge about predictable conditions of our human environment, both
natural and cultural, by constituting the building blocks of a socially
shared cognitive model of this environment. Established expressions of
the language supply conventional perspectives that have in some way
proved useful and functional in the long run. However, social and cul-
tural conditions and environmental circumstances will vary and change
with time engendering changes also in the perspectives and attitudes the
community collectively takes on them. The cognitive function of lan-
guage requires that language as a social cognitive model be adjusted to
these changes. Cognitive and communicative challenges ensuing from
such changes are handled by innovative usage of expressions in the form
of semantic extensions or leaps, which is possible due to the malleable
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structures of meaning. These spontaneous novel conceptualizations re-
ﬂect adaptive ways of understanding in novel situations.
Speakers’ new adaptive conceptualizations of reality may also engen-
der a long-term cognitive adaptation process in language. Novel expres-
sions based on conceptualizations and imagery which prove functional
and adaptive on a wide social basis will be selected for and will become
conventionalized to provide new useful ready-made and thus cognitively
economical ways to conceptually deal with our physical, social and cul-
tural reality. Thus, the historical linguistic process of semantic change
has the long-term adaptive function of adjusting the conceptual cate-
gory system of the language to changing conditions by coding workable
perspectives on them.
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